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A near miss caused some flooding aboard the cruiser Honolulu, quickly repaired. Three hits landed on a destroyer in a floating dry dock. Another hit on an aircraft tender was later mended in a single day at the San Diego shipyard. Overall, the Japanese attack fell far short of its potential. There were eight battleships and eight cruisers in port; four of each were accessible to torpedo attack. The Japanese had more than enough armor-piercing bombs to sink the ships inaccessible to torpedoes, along with two of the four battleships that were either double-berthed or in dry dock, and enough general-purpose bombs to sink all of the cruisers.

But instead of destroying 14 of the 16 priority targets, they dropped killing ordnance on only three: Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Arizona. Two other battleships —California and Nevada—later sank because of flooding, damage control errors, and poor construction. This raised the score to 5 of the 16 priority targets, or only 31 percent—a poorly planned and executed attack, no matter how it is dissected.

Japan succeeded in taking the United States by surprise. Five battleships sank; the loss of American lives shook the nation to its core. December 7, , will never cease to live in infamy. Defeat forces change; victory entrenches the current system, with all its faults. By celebrating its success at Pearl Harbor, Japan sheltered myriad problems. Victory obscured poor planning, to be seen again at Midway; poor staff procedures were evident later at Guadalcanal. Poor target selection, attack tactics, and accuracy appeared again in the carrier battles; poor aerial command and control manifested throughout the war.

Victory perpetuated a samurai approach to aerial combat that led to horrendous losses. Most significantly, Pearl Harbor cemented the Japanese belief that they could achieve stunning victory against all odds—that with sufficient will and the favor of the gods they could achieve the impossible.

First U.S. Air Raid on Tokyo and Japan After Pearl Harbor

This sustained Japan when defeat was inevitable; it prolonged the war; it nurtured the Bushido warrior spirit—and its dark side, the kamikaze. Paradoxically, the Japanese victory at Pearl Harbor firmly entrenched the seeds of the destruction of their navy, and near destruction of their nation. He is a former surface line officer in the U. His book The Attack on Pearl Harbor: The fury stemmed from the memory of how he and numerous others had advised Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto against this insane venture, only to have the commander of the Imperial Japanese Navy arrogantly overrule them.

At the debriefing of his pilots, Nagumo learned the full extent of the disaster. An American combat air patrol had spotted the first wave of planes as they neared the northern coast of Oahu. By the time the attackers had reached Pearl Harbor, swarms of Ps had risen to challenge them, while the sky above the objective roiled with antiaircraft fire from American warships and shore batteries.

The aircraft of the second wave, trailing an hour behind the first, had suffered even greater losses. The above scenario could easily have occurred. And indeed, historically, the second wave, hampered by massive antiaircraft fire, accounted for only 10 percent of the total damage. The American defenders could have received the warning in any of several ways: Short, commander of the defense of Oahu; or by a more precise report from radar operatives, who spotted the incoming attack formation but failed to indicate its size, leading the watch commander to assume it must be a flight of B bombers due from the mainland.

What would have been the sequel to a failed attack? Three scenarios are possible. But with two of his three flattops detached to ferry aircraft to Wake and Midway Islands the third was at San Diego, over 2, miles to the northeast , and just four oilers immediately available out of the 25 required to refuel the fleet at sea, this course of action seems unlikely.

He might have kept the fleet in harbor and confined the fast carriers to brief hit-and-run strikes on Japanese outposts, as occurred historically. Thus he might well have chosen a third course, and steamed west in search of an early, decisive confrontation with Japanese naval forces in the Central Pacific. Nowhere in the official documents do specific directives for such an operation exist. But in War Plan Orange , a magisterial study of naval planning done in preparation for a war in the Pacific, historian Edward S.

Miller notes that the instructions that American submarine and carrier forces were supposed to execute in the event of war with Japan make sense only in the context of an early battle in the Central Pacific. Recollections of those involved and of other historians support that idea.


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His battle force commander recalled that a war game included a full-scale battleship strike as well as carrier and submarine raids. Miller believes Kimmel would have pursued the following plan: American submarines would immediately sail west to reconnoiter and torpedo any enemy vessels they encountered.

Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941

By 16J—the 16th day after the outbreak of war—the U. Preliminary raids by American carrier aircraft would have functioned as bait to lure the Japanese Navy in that direction. With part of the Japanese Navy committed elsewhere, Kimmel anticipated an even match in terms of capital ships. In this he was correct. Yamamoto sent two of his ten battleships to support operations in southeast Asia. Thus, both sides would have had eight battleships available for the fight.

The Japanese would have had an edge in aircraft carriers, but this would have been partially offset by the availability of American land-based aircraft on Wake Island—and the massive depletion of Japanese carrier-based aircraft that resulted from the failed Pearl Harbor attack. The outcome of a major battle in the Central Pacific is impossible to predict.

A decisive American defeat would have been far worse than the historical Pearl Harbor attack. Most of the vessels damaged or sunk were subsequently repaired and returned to action, whereas any warships lost in the Central Pacific would have disappeared beneath thousands of feet of water. But no American victory would have been great enough to prevent the Japanese seizure of Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and the Philippines. All that is certain is that Admiral Husband E.

Congressman accused him of coveting: Beached and burning after being hit by Japanese bombs and torpedoes the Nevada would be rebuilt, modernized serving as a fire-support ship in the invasions of Normandy, Southern France, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. They had both decided that life in the islands, while idyllic, was too uncertain and potentially dangerous for a family household. Emerging on deck, Ruff stepped into another day in paradise. High clouds lingered over the Koolau Mountain Range to the east, but the sun had already burned off most of the early morning overcast.

Lieutenant Ruff joined Father Drinnan in the boat headed for Solace. Kimmel, commander in chief, U. Nests of destroyers bobbed together, tethered to mooring buoys about the harbor. The larger cruisers and auxiliaries rode alone or occupied the limited berthing space at the naval station. The heart of the fleet, seven battleships, rode at their moorings east of Ford Island.

An eighth battleship, Pennsylvania , rested on blocks in dry dock No. While the smaller ships swayed gently in the wind, the broad-beamed, immense battleships were unaffected by the lapping water. In the atmosphere of rising tensions with Japan, Admiral Kimmel wanted to keep his fleet concentrated for any eventuality. For the officers and men, Sunday in port meant holiday routine, with liberty for most of the men and reduced work schedules for those standing watch. As the tropical heat rose and the clouds retreated, December 7, , promised to be an excellent day for relaxation.

Nevada occupied berth Fox 8 alone at the northeast end of the line of battleships. At feet long and 29, tons, Nevada and her sister ship Oklahoma were the smallest and oldest. Nevertheless, each possessed a powerful main battery of 10 inch guns. Twelve 5-inch guns, four 6-pounder anti-aircraft guns and eight. Six Bureau Express oil-fired boilers powered a pair of Parsons turbines generating 25, shaft horsepower for a top speed of While Lieutenant Ruff waited for services to start, the reveille watch on Nevada polished brass, piped away breakfast and woke the forenoon watch.

The assistant quartermaster of the watch woke Ensign Joseph K. Taussig was the junior gunnery officer in charge of the starboard anti-aircraft batteries. He did not have to relieve the watch until 7: Ensign Taussig was descended from a proud naval family. Sir Lewis Bayly asked when they would be available. Taussig relieved the watch promptly at 7: His first duty of the day was to execute colors at 8 a.

A member band and color guard, with proper holiday colors for Sunday, stood ready. Taussig had to precisely follow the lead of the senior officer present afloat, Rear Adm. Furlong on the minesweeper Oglala. At the proper signal, they would raise the national ensign aft and the blue, white-starred jack forward and play the national anthem, simultaneously. Taussig was determined to execute this ceremony in precise military fashion.

The rest of the watch was easy in comparison. First call to colors sounded at 7: Few on deck noticed the planes buzzing around the harbor. The watch piped colors at 8 a. Only what they thought to be an inconsiderate Army aviator roaring low over Battleship Row marred the ceremony. But this was no ill-timed Army drill. Japanese naval aircraft, led by Commander Mitsuo Fuchida, approached Kahuku Point, the northernmost tip of the island of Oahu.

There, the main force broke into smaller attack groups, each proceeding to its primary target. Fuchida, in a Nakajima B5N torpedo bomber, accompanied the high-level bombers. Torpedo bombers, dive bombers and high-level bombers formed up northwest of Kaena Point at 7: Hard on the heels of the first blast came several more. As the B5N torpedo bomber later given the Allied code name of Kate pulled up over Nevada , its rear gunner sprayed the fantail, shredding the flag but, amazingly, missing the tight ranks of bandsmen. Through shock, discipline or habit, the band members finished the anthem before rushing to their battle stations.

Smoke from fires and spray from near-misses obscured the sights of gunners bringing their mounts into action. Ensign Taussig rushed through the press of men to his battle station in the starboard anti-aircraft director. The regularly manned fore and aft. Taussig plugged his sound-powered phones into the net, linking him with the other anti-aircraft stations.

BLOOD AND OIL: WHY JAPAN ATTACKED PEARL

He found many of them already on the line. One 5-inch mount had been manned at the beginning of the raid for its daily systems check. Taussig calmly passed orders while guiding his director from target to target, but the system was inadequate to handle so many attackers. Surprised men scrambled up from below, struggling into their clothes. Marine Private Peyton McDaniel paused to watch a torpedo bear down on the ship. Though he expected it to break the ship in two, Nevada only shuddered and listed somewhat to port. In shock, the ensign felt no pain.

His leg was shattered, and his left foot was lodged up under his armpit. Ignoring his injury and refusing evacuation, Taussig tried to regain control of the gun mounts. While the guns could still fire in local control, Taussig knew that they would be much more effective in directed mode. Most of the connections between his director and the starboard guns were cut, but the wounded ensign continued to give visual spotting reports over his sound-powered phones. Far above, Commander Fuchida guided his bombers down Battleship Row. Although anti-aircraft fire increased steadily, most of the shells burst well below his planes.

Other planes reported similar difficulties, though some managed to drop their bombs. With resistance still largely ineffective, Fuchida did not want to rush the attacks, so he led his charges in a wide circle over Honolulu to make another run. This took only a few minutes, but on the second pass the northern end of Battleship Row was still obscured, this time by the blaze and thick, oily smoke from Arizona.

Despairing of a clear shot at Nevada , Fuchida directed his pilot to try for another ship. A short time later, he heard a roar and rushed to the starboard porthole in time to see Arizona erupt in a ball of flame. The small boat labored across the smoky harbor, strafed but unhit.

Moments later, he scrambled up the accommodation ladder to the quarterdeck. Ruff found himself in the midst of a full-blown shooting war. Minutes after Arizona had been torpedoed, a speeding Kate launched one into Nevada , tearing a byfoot gash in her bow. The gunners labored to maintain a high volume of fire, but the Japanese aircraft seemed to attack with impunity.

Fuses set for too low an altitude caused 5-inch shells to explode below many of the attackers. Lack of coordination reduced overall effectiveness. Ruff saw only a glimpse of this as he headed below to his general quarters station in radio central. Ruff trotted down the passageway, ducking through watertight doors. He reasoned that with Captain Francis Scanland and the executive officer ashore, Lt.

Francis Thomas, the command duty officer, would need all the help he could get. He changed direction and headed up to the navigation bridge. There, higher and more exposed, Ruff could feel the intense heat and smoke from Arizona. When the attack began, Chief Sedberry, on his own initiative, had ordered engineering to prepare to get underway.

Ruff joined Sedberry in preparing the bridge, laying out charts and identifying navigable landmarks for a run to sea. Admiral Furlong had already signaled the fleet to sortie as soon as possible. None of the larger ships had yet attempted to do so. He filled Thomas in on the sortie signal and his readiness on the bridge. Ruff suggested that Thomas handle things belowdecks while he handled topside.

Battling damage and a shortage of manpower, Thomas readily agreed. Time was running out for a sortie. Despite the spirited defense organized by Taussig, assisted by Ensign T. Taylor in the port director, two or three bombs struck Nevada around 8: Ruff opened the hatch leading to the bridge wing but found no one. Returning puzzled, he heard the voice again. After casting about for the location of the voice, Ruff and Sedberry traced it to the deck. They lifted the deck gratings and opened the access hatch—and found Thomas, who had climbed the foot access trunk from his control station.

Mounting damage had convinced him that Nevada must attempt the sortie soon or be pounded under the water. Ruff and Sedberry quickly briefed him, and within 15 minutes Nevada pulled away from Fox 8. By sheer luck, Thomas timed his departure perfectly. With steam to the engines and the steering tested, Thomas directed that Nevada get underway. Chief Boatswain Edwin Hill, led a few sailors to the moorings ashore to cast off the lines. They then dove into the treacherous waters and swam back to the ship. Thomas, Ruff and Sedberry now began the difficult maneuvers involved in getting the 29,ton battleship out of Pearl Harbor unassisted.

As Ruff remembered, it usually took two hours to build steam in all boilers, and required several tugs, a civilian harbor pilot, the navigator and the captain to get underway. The three of them would attempt the channel passage alone, under attack, their ship damaged by both flooding and fires. Ruff found the prospect daunting. With Thomas conning, Ruff navigating and Sedberry manning the helm, Nevada eased back from her berth.

Ruff aligned his landmarks on Ford Island and fed Thomas positions and recommended courses to steer. The deck crew still managed to throw a line to three sailors in the water. Wet and oily, they promptly joined the crew of the nearest 5-inch battery. Naval Academy classmates had been serving on Arizona , and he could only wonder if any had survived her destruction. West Virginia came into sight next. She had taken several torpedoe hits, and she was settling into the mud on an even keel, thanks to rapid counterflooding.

Oklahoma had turned turtle, trapping many sailors inside. Tennessee and Maryland were moored inboard and had escaped torpedo damage. Still, smoke rose from both of them. Finally, Nevada steamed past California , the flagship of the battle force. Flames surrounded her and she, too, was settling on an even keel. Nevada cleared the end of Battleship Row just before 9 a.

Ahead lay the dredge Turbine and its pipeline attached to Ford Island. Maneuvering through the narrow space between the dredge and Dock would be challenging on a normal day. Now time was running out; the second wave of Japanese planes began to arrive in force. Planes destined for Pennsylvania dove on Nevada instead. If they could sink her, they could bottle up the South Channel or, better yet, the main channel off Hospital Point, for months. Casualties mounted in the gun crews.

Flying splinters raked the decks, and fires set off ready ammunition. Solar, who had taken charge of his mount until its officers arrived, fell to shrapnel. Seaman 1st Class W. Neundorf, gun captain of No. Most of the bombs struck forward, making a shambles of the forecastle. Ruff, Thomas and Sedberry hung on.

Still, the officers on the bridge hoped that they might make it to open water. The air portion of the attack began at 7: Hawaiian Time [16] 3: A total of [17] Japanese planes in two waves reached Oahu. Slow, vulnerable torpedo bombers led the first wave, exploiting the first moments of surprise to attack the most important ships present the battleships , while dive bombers attacked U. Army Air Forces fighter base.

At least two of those bombs broke up on impact, another detonated before penetrating an unarmored deck, and one was a dud. Thirteen of the forty torpedoes hit battleships, and four torpedoes hit other ships. The famous message, "Air raid Pearl Harbor. This is not drill. The defenders were very unprepared. Thomas commanded Nevada in the captain's absence and got her under way until the ship was grounded at 9: The second planned wave consisted of planes: The second wave was divided into three groups.

The separate sections arrived at the attack point almost simultaneously from several directions. Ninety minutes after it began, the attack was over. Two thousand and eight sailors were killed, and others wounded; soldiers and airmen who were part of the Army until the independent U. Air Force was formed in were killed and wounded; marines were killed and 69 wounded; and 68 civilians were killed and 35 wounded. In total, 2, American soldiers died and 1, were wounded. Already damaged by a torpedo and on fire amidships, Nevada attempted to exit the harbor.

She was deliberately beached to avoid blocking the harbor entrance. California was hit by two bombs and two torpedoes. The crew might have kept her afloat, but were ordered to abandon ship just as they were raising power for the pumps. Burning oil from Arizona and West Virginia drifted down on her, and probably made the situation look worse than it was. The disarmed target ship Utah was holed twice by torpedoes.

West Virginia was hit by seven torpedoes, the seventh tearing away her rudder. Oklahoma was hit by four torpedoes, the last two above her belt armor , which caused her to capsize. Maryland was hit by two of the converted 16" shells, but neither caused serious damage. Although the Japanese concentrated on battleships the largest vessels present , they did not ignore other targets. The light cruiser Helena was torpedoed, and the concussion from the blast capsized the neighboring minelayer Oglala. Two destroyers in dry dock , Cassin and Downes were destroyed when bombs penetrated their fuel bunkers.

The leaking fuel caught fire; flooding the dry dock in an effort to fight fire made the burning oil rise, and both were burned out. Cassin slipped from her keel blocks and rolled against Downes. The light cruiser Raleigh was holed by a torpedo. The light cruiser Honolulu was damaged, but remained in service. The repair vessel Vestal , moored alongside Arizona , was heavily damaged and beached. The seaplane tender Curtiss was also damaged. The destroyer Shaw was badly damaged when two bombs penetrated her forward magazine.

Of the American aircraft in Hawaii, were destroyed and damaged, of them on the ground. Eight Army Air Forces pilots managed to get airborne during the attack [97] and six were credited with downing at least one Japanese aircraft during the attack: Rasmussen , 2nd Lt. Taylor , 2nd Lt. Welch , 2nd Lt. Brown , and 2nd Lt. Sterling was shot down by Lt. Dains was killed by friendly fire returning from a victory over Kaawa. The three on patrol returned undamaged. Friendly fire brought down some U. Japanese attacks on barracks killed additional personnel.

At the time of the attack, nine civilian aircraft were flying in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. Of these, three were shot down. Fifty-five Japanese airmen and nine submariners were killed in the attack, and one was captured. Of Japan's [82] available planes, 29 were lost during the battle nine in the first attack wave, 20 in the second , [] [nb 16] with another 74 damaged by antiaircraft fire from the ground.

Several Japanese junior officers including Fuchida and Genda urged Nagumo to carry out a third strike in order to destroy as much of Pearl Harbor's fuel and torpedo [nb 17] storage, maintenance, and dry dock facilities as possible. Pacific Fleet far more seriously than the loss of its battleships. Nimitz , later Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, "it would have prolonged the war another two years.

At a conference aboard his flagship the following morning, Yamamoto supported Nagumo's withdrawal without launching a third wave. Yamamoto later regretted Nagumo's decision to withdraw and categorically stated it had been a great mistake not to order a third strike. Twenty-one ships were damaged or lost in the attack, of which all but three were repaired and returned to service. After a systematic search for survivors, formal salvage operations began.

In this Book

Pacific Fleet, was immediately ordered to lead salvage operations. Around Pearl Harbor, divers from the Navy shore and tenders , the Naval Shipyard , and civilian contractors Pacific Bridge and others began work on the ships that could be refloated. They patched holes, cleared debris, and pumped water out of ships. Navy divers worked inside the damaged ships.

Within six months, five battleships and two cruisers were patched or refloated so they could be sent to shipyards in Pearl Harbor and on the mainland for extensive repair. Intensive salvage operations continued for another year, a total of some 20, man-hours under water. Arizona and the target ship Utah were too heavily damaged for salvage, though much of their armament and equipment was removed and put to use aboard other vessels. Today, the two hulks remain where they were sunk, [] with Arizona becoming a war memorial. The day after the attack, Roosevelt delivered his famous Infamy Speech to a Joint Session of Congress , calling for a formal declaration of war on the Empire of Japan.

Congress obliged his request less than an hour later. The UK actually declared war on Japan nine hours before the U. The attack was an initial shock to all the Allies in the Pacific Theater. Further losses compounded the alarming setback. Japan attacked the Philippines hours later because of the time difference, it was December 8 in the Philippines.

Only three days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the battleships Prince of Wales and Repulse were sunk off the coast of Malaya , causing British Prime Minister Winston Churchill later to recollect "In all the war I never received a more direct shock. As I turned and twisted in bed the full horror of the news sank in upon me. Over this vast expanse of waters Japan was supreme and we everywhere were weak and naked".

Throughout the war, Pearl Harbor was frequently used in American propaganda. One further consequence of the attack on Pearl Harbor and its aftermath notably the Niihau incident was that Japanese American residents and citizens were relocated to nearby Japanese-American internment camps.

Within hours of the attack, hundreds of Japanese American leaders were rounded up and brought to high-security camps such as Sand Island at the mouth of Honolulu harbor and Kilauea Military Camp on the island of Hawaii. The attack also had international consequences. The Canadian province of British Columbia , bordering the Pacific Ocean , had long had a large population of Japanese immigrants and their Japanese Canadian descendants.

Pre-war tensions were exacerbated by the Pearl Harbor attack, leading to a reaction from the Government of Canada. On February 24, , Order-in-Council P. On 4 March, regulations under the Act were adopted to evacuate Japanese-Canadians. The Japanese planners had determined that some means was required for rescuing fliers whose aircraft were too badly damaged to return to the carriers. The island of Niihau, only 30 minutes flying time from Pearl Harbor, was designated as the rescue point.

The aircraft was further damaged on landing. Nishikaichi was helped from the wreckage by one of the native Hawaiians, who, aware of the tension between the United States and Japan, took the pilot's maps and other documents. The island's residents had no telephones or radio and were completely unaware of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Nishikaichi enlisted the support of three Japanese-American residents in an attempt to recover the documents. During the ensuing struggles, Nishikaichi was killed and a Hawaiian civilian was wounded; one collaborator committed suicide, and his wife and the third collaborator were sent to prison.

The ease with which the local ethnic Japanese residents had apparently gone to the assistance of Nishikaichi was a source of concern for many, and tended to support those who believed that local Japanese could not be trusted. Admiral Hara Tadaichi summed up the Japanese result by saying, "We won a great tactical victory at Pearl Harbor and thereby lost the war. While the attack accomplished its intended objective, it turned out to be largely unnecessary.

Unbeknownst to Yamamoto, who conceived the original plan, the U. Navy had decided as far back as to abandon 'charging' across the Pacific towards the Philippines in response to an outbreak of war in keeping with the evolution of Plan Orange. Fortunately for the United States, the American aircraft carriers were untouched by the Japanese attack; otherwise the Pacific Fleet's ability to conduct offensive operations would have been crippled for a year or more given no diversions from the Atlantic Fleet.

As it was, the elimination of the battleships left the U. Navy with no choice but to rely on its aircraft carriers and submarines—the very weapons with which the U. Navy halted and eventually reversed the Japanese advance. While six of the eight battleships were repaired and returned to service, their relatively low speed and high fuel consumption limited their deployment, and they served mainly in shore bombardment roles their only major action being the Battle of Surigao Strait in October A major flaw of Japanese strategic thinking was a belief that the ultimate Pacific battle would be fought by battleships, in keeping with the doctrine of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan.

As a result, Yamamoto and his successors hoarded battleships for a "decisive battle" that never happened. The Japanese confidence in their ability to achieve a short, victorious war meant that they neglected Pearl Harbor's navy repair yards, oil tank farms, submarine base, and old headquarters building. The survival of the repair shops and fuel depots allowed Pearl Harbor to maintain logistical support to the U. Navy's operations, [] [] such as the Battles of Coral Sea and Midway.

- Document - A War It Was Always Going to Lose: Why Japan Attacked America in

It was submarines that immobilized the Imperial Japanese Navy's heavy ships and brought Japan's economy to a virtual standstill by crippling the transportation of oil and raw materials: Ever since the Japanese attack, there has been debate as to how and why the United States had been caught unaware, and how much and when American officials knew of Japanese plans and related topics. Military officers including Gen. Billy Mitchell had pointed out the vulnerability of Pearl to air attack. At least two naval war games, one in and another in , proved that Pearl was vulnerable to such an attack. Admiral James Richardson was removed from command shortly after protesting President Roosevelt's decision to move the bulk of the Pacific fleet to Pearl Harbor.

However, this conspiracy theory is rejected by mainstream historians. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Two attacking Japanese planes can be seen: Events leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Order of battle of the Attack on Pearl Harbor. Consequences of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory. Attack on Pearl Harbor in popular culture. There is, however, no doubt that they did know, as did the Japanese. Mitsuo Fuchida about his observations. Fuchida led the Japanese attack on December 7, Pearl Harbor deep averages 42 feet. But the Japanese borrowed an idea from the British carrier-based torpedo raid on the Italian naval base of Taranto. They fashioned auxiliary wooden tail fins to keep the torpedoes horizontal, so they would dive to only 35 feet, and they added a breakaway "nosecone" of soft wood to cushion the impact with the surface of the water.

Even after the war, however, he received recriminating correspondence from those who despised him for not sacrificing his own life. The Combat Air Patrol over the carriers alternated 18 plane shifts every two hours, with 18 more ready for takeoff on the flight decks and an additional 18 ready on hangar decks. P, killed in action , Harry W. Brown P , Kenneth M. Taylor P, 2 , and George S. Three of the P kills were not verified by the Japanese and may have been shot down by naval anti-aircraft fire.

This was confirmed by Beloite and Beloite after years of research and debate. Miller was an African-American cook aboard West Virginia who took over an unattended anti-aircraft gun on which he had no training. He was the first African-American sailor to be awarded the Navy Cross. She continues to leak small amounts of fuel oil , over 70 years after the attack. The harbor there was blocked by scuttled Italian and German ships, which prevented British use of the port. Commander Edward Ellsberg was sent instead.

Lack of fuel and an inflexible training policy meant that they could not be replaced. Kimmel , Admiral Kimmel's Story. The attack on Pearl Harbor—"a date that will live in infamy " ". Retrieved 8 December Archived from the original on July 10, Retrieved July 5, Archived from the original on August 6, Retrieved October 5, Retrieved December 7, The Pearl Harbor Papers Brassey's, , p. Royal Australian Navy — Australia in the War of — Series 2 — Navy.

Archived from the original on May 25, Retrieved June 16, December 7, , p. Retrieved August 12, — via Newspapers. The New York Times. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: Harvard University Asia Center. McCaffrey September 22, Imperial Japan's World War Two, — Miller , War Plan Orange: The Fatal Turn Morton, Louis. The Decision for War Morton, Louis. Retrieved November 28, Shinjuwan Kogeki Tokyo, , p. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, At Dawn We Slept: Archived from the original on June 30, Retrieved July 17, Retrieved January 20, French December 9, Archived from the original on June 23, At Dawn We Slept.

The American Century London: